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Foreword
Sources on this period of Chilean history 
are very scarce in Notth America and often 
contradictory. Consquently I have adopted 
the following method of referencing: Direct 
quotes from sources are cited immediately; 
Souroes used to create a composite pioture 
of a time period are all cited together 
at the end of that period, i.e. each day; 
Bibliography includes sources consulted 
as well as cited; An additional biblio­
graphy of sources known to this author, 
which should be of primary importance but 
were unavailable to him during this re­
search, is included at the end.
This paper is presented in two sections;
A calendar of known facts of the "Social­
ist Republic” ; and Interpretations of 
those facts, primarily the Socialist 
legend which has grown up around the 
"Republic", as well as other viewpoints, 
including this author’s, challenging 
that legend.
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The Setting
As dusk was falling on Santiago, Chile, that autumn 
evening of June 4, 1932, three men strode forcefully into the
Moneda Palace. There they confronted a worried President 
Juan Montero and his cabinet with an ultimatum; resign turn­
ing the government over to them, or, face an armed clash in 
the capital city. The President refused to resign and grace 
the coup with an aura of legality. Not having the necessary 
forces to quell the revolt, Montero quietly left the Palace 
allowing the insurgents to seize the reins of government.
With the assumption of power by the rebel junta, a government 
and a legend were born which were to haunt Chile for the next 
forty years.
This new regime came to be known in history as the 
"Socialist Republic", with the legend principally centering 
around the man perceived to be its leader, Colonel Marmaduke 
Grove. The three men who confronted President Montero that 
evening were to be the "Republic's" principal leaders and, 
among them, its executioner. Grove was the expected member 
of the trio. The charismatic commander of the air force had 
a history of revolutionary attempts and enforced exiles. He 
had led the insurgent troops into Santiago. His friend and 
trusted civilian aide, Eugenio Matte, accompanied him that 
evening. Matte's appearance was hardly startling either, as
2he was Grove's assistant and the head of a small radical 
socialist group. New Public Action. As the only socialist 
leader involved in the coup, Matte became a member of the new 
socialist junta.
Rounding out the trio that evening was Carlos Davila.
On the surface, he appeared an unlikely partner. Davila was 
a leading Santiago journalist and a man with an impeccable 
reputation. He had been the Ambassador to the United States 
under the right-wing Ibanez military regime and had returned 
from that post only a year earlier. But Davila was not only 
involved in the socialist revolt, he was the leader of the 
new junta and its only member destined to stay in power more 
than a fortnight.
That insurgent junta and the Grove legend have become so 
entwined over the years that the period has come to be known 
as "the twelve day Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove".
The legend has been so built-up over the years by various 
leftist political factions that it has all but obscured the 
historical realities of the regime. Curiously, the tradi­
tionally history-conscious Left has conspicuously avoided 
publishing any hard data on that government. Consequently,
Grove and the "Socialist Republic" have passed into history 
as the legend depicts them, unchallenged by historical research.
3To evaluate the validity of the Grove legend, it must 
be put alongside the historical facts of the period. These 
facts are not widely known and are in dispute as little has 
been published since shortly after the "Republic's" fall. For 
North Americans, the best sources are still the international 
news reports at the time and the diplomatic dispatches to the 
various countries involved with Chile during the "Republic's" 
brief life. The Chilean sources, which should be invaluable, 
are lacking in this country. Only by a compilation of the 
observations of the reporters and diplomats on the scene can 
a North American hope to adequately test the legend.
The Twelve Day Republic: 
A Calendar
4June 4 - Saturday-
On Friday, June 3, 1932, Defense Minister Ignacio 
Urratia had requested Colonel Marmaduke Grove to relinquish 
his command of the Chilean Air Force. Colonel Grove had
agreed to turn over his command upon the arrival of his
/
properly designated replacement. Commander Ramon Vergara, 
having been named Grove's successor, then had arrived at El 
Basque air base shortly after midnight to assume command of 
the Air Force, but upon his arrival Commander Vergara had 
been arrested and imprisoned by Grove's troops.
While these activities had begun as a seemingly routine 
military command change, no command change involving Grove 
was ever simple. He had twice been exiled and once discharged 
from the military for his political activities and insubordin­
ation.-1- His personal history of revolutionary activity was 
long and varied and had prompted former President Ibanez to 
comment, "He [Grove] was born a revolutionary, as others are 
born blond or brunette."2 While supposedly awaiting the 
arrival of his replacement, Grove had begun marshalling his 
forces for a coup. He had secured the aid of four powerful 
figures in Chilean politics and military affairs. The insur­
gent leadership was shared by Grove, General Arturo Puga,
5Commander Arturo Merino, Carlos Davila and Eugenio Matte. 
After meeting far into the night, the insurgents were ready 
to move against the government at the dawn of June 4.
Realizing something had gone awry in his attempts to 
oust Colonel Grove, President Montero called an early morning 
meeting of the leadership of all major political parties. 
There he explained he was expecting a barracks revolt and 
asked for their support in quelling the rebellion, should it 
occur. The leaders of all the parties, except the Liberals, 
pledged their loyalties to the Montero government against any 
military-imposed junta.
Early that same morning, Air Force planes took off from 
El Basque and headed up to Santiago, only ten miles to the 
north. Their mission was to bomb the city with pamphlets.
The leaflets called for a new government dedicated to a 
socialist and state-controlled economy. Their message 
severely criticized foreign capitalism in Chile and the 
wealthy classes who assisted it in bleeding the poorer 
classes. The pamphlets also threatened to bomb the Moneda 
Palace if the government did not resign so a new government 
to implement their demands could be created.
When President Montero did not capitulate, Colonel 
Grove marched his troops from El Basque into Santiago. Fif-
6teen blocks from the Moneda Palace he halted, stationed his
/
troops and waited. As evening came, he, Davila and Matte 
went to the Palace, confronted President Montero and assumed 
3power. J
Despite the pledges and programs issued in the leaflets 
dropped by the planes, the junta was still unsure of its 
course that evening. Davila was named to the new junta, and 
immediately became its principal spokesman, with General Puga 
as its Provisional President and Matte completing the member­
ship. The country looked anxiously to Davila, their trusted 
diplomat, for some explanation of the path this new "socialist" 
government was to follow. Only a month before he had issued 
a lengthy manifesto calling for state socialism. He had 
asserted that only state control of the production and dis­
tribution of the country's main products, including nitrates, 
could bring the country out of the depression. His manifesto 
had been premised on the assertion that Chile's condition 
warranted "a trial of socialism adapted to our national 
peculiarities."4 But when asked that evening about his plans, 
Davila could only answer with bland assurances: "We expect
to put into effect here an outstanding regime that will be 
strong and solid, one that everyone can depend on. I really 
know little of what our program will be, except our plans for 
a socialist state."5
7June 5 - Sunday
The first major act of the new junta was to unveil its 
plans for the transformation of Chile into a socialist state. 
That morning the junta published a manifesto (Appendix A) and 
a program of immediate action (Appendix B), which quickly 
produced repercussions at home and abroad. Their major 
points fell roughly into four areas of concern: political, 
economic, international and c l a s s - o r i e n t e d .  ^ While most of 
the proposals were radical, the document as a whole was not 
very socialistic.
The political portions were the least radical. The 
junta declared itself in power, dissolved Congress and called 
for a new constitution, all of which were not unheard of 
actions, though unusual for the Chilean style of politics.
The most radical move was to pardon the sailors and political 
prisoners involved in attempted revolutions against the 
former government. Such a move might allow more revolution­
aries to assume an active role in the "revolution" and per­
haps gain some support within the Navy, which had not partici­
pated in the coup.
The economic portions were not at all in the tradition 
of socialist programs. Nowhere was there any mention of
8socializing the means of production. The major economic 
plans called for establishing monopolies and setting up a 
Commercial House of State upon which to base a social sector 
within the capitalist economy. Socialization of credit was 
the most radical program proposed. This move would require 
state control, at least, or possibly even outright destruc­
tion of the present financial system. As the financial sector 
was the heart of the capitalist enterprise, both foreign and 
domestic, this plan was certain to rouse resistance.
It was the international front which appeared most 
ominous after the release of the manifesto. The programs 
concerning the Compania de Salitre de Chile (Cosach) were of 
prime importance.7 Cosach was the firm which controlled the 
nitrate industry, the country's most important product, as 
well as the source of most of her foreign investment and 
exchange. Any move towards the firm was a major policy 
switch and one which would be regarded as anti-imperialistic. 
The manifesto's calls to open mines outside of Cosach and 
dissolve the combine were certain to meet extreme resistance 
from abroad.
The class-oriented proposals gave the manifesto its 
radical flavor and set the path the junta followed to gain 
support. The distribution of food and unproductive farm
9land to the unemployed, the suspension of evictions and
occupation of abandoned houses were all visible payments
\
which the masses could collect by supporting the junta. New 
tax measures against the rich were expected to add 500 million 
pesos to the state treasury as well as place the new regime 
firmly at the head of a mass-based movement.^
The manifesto made very clear that the upper classes
were expected to be in opposition and the masses were to be 
favored at their e x p e n s e . ^ United States Ambassador Culberson 
analyzed the situation that evening in his report to Washington:
Junta for the time being has the military force 
necessary to maintain its power but the properited 
and conservative classes will not accept the social­
istic measures proposed without resistance. More­
over, the Junta will encounter practical difficulties 
at every turn in case it attempts to put in force its 
radical measures. If it should go so far as to 
resort to force and confiscation we will see resis­
tance and conflict.10
The success or failure of the government was to rest on
its ability to generate the support necessary to maintain
itself in power while attempting to implement these proposals.
An outlook for success was not shared in all quarters. After 
reading the reports of the manifesto and programs, British 
Foreign Office analyst R. L. Craige wrote, "If I were a 
prophet, I should predict a short and stormy life for this 
government." H  The moral force of the legend of the "Social-
10
ist Republic" rests on its attempts to realize its radical 
manifesto.
June 6 - Monday
Monday morning brought back the realities of the world 
to Chile. It was the first workday under the new regime, the 
banks were to open and business to resume. However, the bank 
workers called a strike which was joined by other profes­
sionals to protest the new government's intentions toward 
the banks. The work interruption prevented the banks from 
opening. The junta replied by closing the banks for three 
days so that they could have time to investigate the bank 
problem in more detail and decide on a practical program.-*-2
If the banks did not present enough of a problem, the 
courts compounded it. The Supreme Court ordered all courts 
suspended and inoperable under the junta. Even as the 
domestic resistance mounted, it was becoming clear that the 
mounting international concern over plans for the nitrate 
industry might eclipse all domestic concerns. The inter­
national community was clearly opposed to any nationalization 
plan.
Over the question of how to handle the international 
problems the first rift appeared in the new government.
11
Davila took the lead in developing a policy of moderation.
His policy statements that day contradicted both the letter
✓
and spirit of the previous day's manifesto. Davila sent a 
telegram to the "New York Times" and had an interview with 
the "Times" (London) correspondent. He indicated that moder­
ation:/. not radicalism, was to be his guiding principle. The 
government would proceed slowly in deciding the nitrate 
question. Any plan would be implemented within the existing 
recognized international monetary system. Confiscation of 
foreign currency bank accounts, as had been widely rumored, 
was also dismissed as a goal. In his telegram to the "New 
York Times" Davila best explained his new policy outlook: 
"Notwithstanding the socialistic atmosphere, the new govern­
ment has not contemplated drastic measures far removed from 
past practices of most affairs of state . . .  No changes of 
importance are considered except to foster international 
understanding between s t a t e s . " ^  He indicated that within 
this policy Soviet Russia would probably be recognized.
Also taking up the policy of moderation was General Puga, 
the Provisional President, Appearing more clearly now as 
Davila's ally, Puga tried to create the impression that the 
new government was not comprised entirely of revolutionaries 
or even represented all of them. In an interview that day,
12
he stated, ". . . we do not deny the formation of revolution­
ary groups to oppose us, among whom are some communistic 
members. I simply ask, Where is the government which has not 
some opposition?
The statements of Puga and Davila emphasized the contra­
dictions between the radical manifesto and practical reformist 
politics. Questions were being raised as to whether the 
country was going to be fully socialistic or simply one with 
a regulated capitalism; and whether it was to be rigid or 
pliable toward international interests. These policy questions 
were the first public sign of the growing factionalism within 
the junta. Reports in diplomatic circles of the previous day 
indicated Davila and Puga were pushing for moderation; Grove 
and Matte for radicalism.-^ The key to the answers of these 
questions was likely to be in the disposition of the Cosach 
problem.^
June 7 - Tuesday
As the junta members began to feel the pressure of 
rising opposition, they began a series of programs designed 
to build institutional and popular support. At the institu­
tional level, the regime announced some new plans of impor­
tance. First, they dealt with the Congress. The legislative
13
body was partially dissolved and its functions pre-empted by 
the junta. Those legislators who had been appointed during 
the Ibanez dictatorship were removed. New elections were 
scheduled for November to fill those seats. At that time 
Congress, hopefully friendly to the new regime, would resume 
its legislative function.
A second institutional move was the granting of amnesty 
to all social and political prisoners. These included naval 
personnel who had attempted earlier in the year to topple the 
government. These men were pardoned and reinstated in the 
military service, a move which would hopefully produce a 
military more loyal to the junta. This move would be opposed 
by most officers, but would be popular with the lower ranks 
and serve to reduce the officers' influence. As the naval 
officers had not supported the coup, the junta's seduction 
of the lower ranks was not an unsound policy.
The junta also announced its plan to eliminate unemploy­
ment within a month by the creation of new economic institu­
tions. The government would create three state companies; 
one for agriculture, one for mining, and one industrial. The 
companies would hire the unemployed throughout the country as 
their labor force. The theory was that once these companies 
began operating they would strengthen the government's posi-
14
tion in the economic sphere. By adding a more dynamic sector 
to oppose the private sector, which was largely controlled by 
the government's opponents, the regime might be immune from 
economic pressures.
The real battle for survival was going to be for the 
allegiance of the people. By their absolute passivity during 
the coup, it was clear that they were not attached to the 
Montero government. However, it was equally clear that the 
new military-imposed regime had not yet captured their sup­
port. British Charge^d'Affaires Thompson summarized the 
situation that morning:
Revolutionary government have failed to obtain 
the public support which they evidently counted upon, 
given the widespread discontent in the country due to 
the economic crisis. That this support is conspicu­
ous by its absence is due to the extreme violence of 
methods used - aeroplanes, demonstrations and so 
forth - to unpopularity of military dictatorships of 
which this country has had enough for the time being 
and to the unhappy wording of their first proclama­
tion which has given every reason to assume that the 
political views of the junta are of a deeper hue than 
pink.1 "7
The questions over policies to be pursued to build popu­
lar support was accenting the split in the junta. Puga quietly 
resigned as Minister of Interior, though he remained on the 
junta. The ministry had been his more powerful position as 
it had given him control of the police forces. His replace-
15
ment, Rolando Merino, was more radical and a shift in the 
direction of the Left was beginning.18
The government announced the first two programs of a 
series of popular measures aimed at securing an alliance with 
the masses. No evictions were to be made for unpaid rent for 
any dwelling renting for less than 200 pesos a month. All 
tools and clothing held as collateral in government pawn 
shops were to be returned to their owners without charge. 
These measures were aimed at the urban poor and working clas­
ses. The decrees could have come directly from the proclama­
tions of the Paris Commune of 1871, a predecessor the junta 
now seemed to be emulating.
The opposition, however, was neither dead nor withering 
away. Concern for their power was shown in three other 
proclamations issued that day. First, firearms were confis­
cated from the Civic Guards and other private organizations. 
These groups were largely middle and upper class, and intent 
on defending their homes and property. Second, the Finance 
Minister announced he would delay any moves to confiscate 
Cosach holdings until the government could study the question 
further. The government recommendations would likely be sub­
mitted to the new Congress in November, giving the interna­
tional concerns sufficient time to negotiate an arrangement
16
suitable to all. Third, the government announced plans for 
the reorganization of the National University, then being 
administered by a board of three professors and three stu­
dents. This move was in reply to student opponents who had 
seized a university building and were calling for a general 
strike to overturn the new regime.
On the other side of the spectrum there was increasing 
evidence of some mass movement in favor of the government. 
Workers held a number of demonstrations in Santiago that 
Tuesday, most of which were in support of the new junta. One, 
however, was anti-clerical and organized against nuns after 
the newspaper "La Liberdad" announced the junta was consider­
ing laws banning religious orders. Even as the demonstration 
was in progress, the junta was denying any designs against 
either religious orders or their property. While the junta 
was prepared to challenge the propertied classes with many 
radical ideas for change, apparently it was not yet prepared 
to reopen the traditional liberal - conservative schism over 
the role of the Church in the s o c i e t y . 19
June 8 - Wednesday
The split in the junta over policy was daily becoming 
more evident. While Davila and Puga continued their pursuit
17
of moderation, Grove and Matte attempted to make the original 
program a reality. These differences became clearer that 
Wednesday as the workers of Santiago confronted the govern­
ment with some genuinely radical demands. These demands were 
purported to be the price of their support.
The workingmen's societies of Santiago had called a mass 
open air rally, at which many speeches were given, some radi­
cal and violent in tone. It was then decided by the leaders 
at the rally to lay their demands before the junta. The crowd 
then marched down the Calle Moneda to the Palace, and once 
there, demanded an audience with the junta. It was Matte, 
the only genuine socialist leader in the regime, who came to 
listen to their demands.
The two most significant demands were for the regime to 
give the workers the use of the Club de la Union and to arm 
a "Red Army". The Club de la Union was a private aristo­
cratic social club. The workers wanted it turned over to 
them for a recreation center in the "soviet style". More 
importantly the workers wanted to form a "Republican 
Socialist Guard" and have the government arm it. The workers 
would then take up arms to assist the junta in realizing its 
aim of socializing the country. No other single demand could 
have struck more fear into the hearts of the military or
18
conservatives than the spector of an armed, undisciplined 
workers' army. Matte listened to their demands. Addressing 
them, he told the rally that the junta was determined to 
carry out its full program and do justice to the long- 
suffering proletariat, a view clearly not shared by all his 
colleagues. However, he made no firm commitment toward ful­
fillment of the specific demands.
Other problems also had to be faced that day. Wednesday 
was the last day the banks were to be closed under Monday's 
order. The Finance Minister, Alfredo la Garique, announced 
the Central Bank was being reorganized and that a council of 
workers was to take over control of the Savings Banks. He 
also proposed expropriating the foreign currency accounts on 
deposit in Chilean banks. None of his proposals were put 
into effect that day. The time was approaching when these, 
or some other plans, had to be agreed upon and enacted if the 
banks were to open and the economy to normalize.
In another economic move the Minister of Education 
announced a plan to employ 100,000 of the unemployed. The 
plan called for the founding of state corporations, in addi­
tion to those proposed by the junta the previous day. These 
would be for transportation, warehousing, distribution and 
purchasing. Among their activities would be taking over con-
19
trol of the rail system. These corporations were designed to 
provide the social infrastructure necessary to support the 
productive corporations Davila had proposed. Together they 
could make the social sector dominant in the economy.
The junta also announced it was studying a proposal to 
trade nitrates for Soviet oil. Where this proposal origina­
ted is not clear, but it was certain to set off internal as 
well as international repercussions. The junta also pro­
hibited the sale of arms, ammunition and explosives. This was 
a further attempt to disarm, or at least prevent the future 
arming, of the opposition'& organizations. The junta recog­
nized that if the workers were to be armed for the "Republic's" 
defense, the weapons would have to come from the government 
anyway, as most of the workers could not afford to adequately 
arm themselves.^0
June 9 - Thursday
Thursday was the day the banking question had to be 
/
decided. Despite Davila's assurances of moderation, the 
junta promulgated two radical decrees. The Central Bank was 
nationalized and renamed the "Banco Del Estado". Its board 
of governors was dissolved and a new administration was to 
be appointed later by the government. The second decree was
20
of more importance to the international community. The junta 
announced all deposits of foreign currency were to be expropri­
ated. These deposits were being credited to the government 
accounts. The owners of the deposits were to be reimbursed 
in pesos at the official exchange rate of June 3, the day 
before the revolution.2^
The confiscation decree was certain to raise the ire of 
the international community. Not only was the peso no longer 
worth what it had been on June 3, but the official rate that 
day had been greatly inflated. To stop further devaluation 
of the peso, the junta enacted two additional controls. Only 
small withdrawals were allowed from banks, and these had to 
be in pesos. Strict controls were also imposed on the stock 
market in an attempt to rectify the fiscal situation.
While the financial problems generally occupied most of 
the junta's attention, Thursday marked its first serious step 
toward socializing the economy. The government announced 
plans to take over the big sugar refinery at VifTa del Mar.
The refinery would become state-owned and run by a committee 
of the state and the workers. This was the first attempt at 
internal property expropriation and the beginnings of the new 
Commercial House of the State. Such a move so soon in the 
regime's existence was bound to bring a reaction from both the
21
workers and the owners. The government did not have to wait 
long for a reaction. That same day the workers at the paper 
"El Mercurio" demanded the paper be turned over to them to be 
run on a socialized basis by a workers' committee.22
June 10 - Friday
Banking continued to be the junta's main concern Friday. 
Reactions came that day from the international community in 
response to Thursday's decree. United States Ambassador 
Culberson, acting on behalf of the City National Bank of New 
York, protested the order seizing foreign currency deposits. 
Many of his diplomatic colleagues also submitted protests.
The government did not remain 'unmoved in the face of these 
pressures. The Finance Minister met with leading bankers all 
day. The bankers complained not only that the decrees were 
unjust but also impossible to comply with and have the banks 
remain functional institutions. The Minister promised to 
reconsider the decrees and issue clarifying orders soon.
The protests had an effect for the junta did not imple­
ment the decrees. Government officials privately expressed 
their opinions to the diplomatic corps that the decrees would 
be modified, at least toward foreign concerns, before being 
put into effect. To calm international fears the junta ad-
22
vanced a more moderate proposal. By its terms the newly 
nationalized Banco Del Estado would be the central feature.
The shares of the old Central Bank owned by private citizens 
or other banks would be expropriated with payment at a fair 
price. In this manner the bank would be converted into a 
state organization and the investors would not be hurt. The 
state bank would then continue to serve the same function, in 
the same manner, as the private bank had. The only difference 
would be its new directors and the use of some of its assets 
to erect a new system of state credit banks to assist the 
masses.
These proposals did allay the international fears some­
what. The only fiscal decree the junta did put into force 
immediately was a new order closing shops which bought gold 
or silver and then melted it for export. In the financial 
field the junta was creating the impression of "paper revolu­
tionaries". They appeared to attack the heart of capitalism, 
the banking and international investment businesses. However, 
after making radical pronouncements and hearing the anguished 
complaints, the revolutionaries brought about only mild re­
forms to stabilize the currency. Nothing that the revolution­
aries had effected so far was more than a nuisance to the 
capitalists.
23
Lest anyone get the impression that the regime had 
abandoned socialism, Davila issued a statement explaining the 
overall economic program for the country. According to him, 
the government was trying to found and promote state enter­
prises in all major economic sectors. Their purpose was to 
raise internal productivity, cut imports and improve the 
balance of trade. Socialism was part of this scheme. "Private 
enterprise will not be brought to an end, but a collectivist 
economy will be created to supplement the existing individ­
ualist economy. The latter will be submitted to severe con­
trols in order to substitute, as far as possible, the competi­
tive system for a far-reaching co-operative o n e . D a v i l a ' s  
message, and even his avoidance of the terms capitalism and
socialism, sounded a note of restrained, responsible, moder-
/
ate state action. Within the scope of Davila's statement, 
the government announced it had plans for price controls on 
foods and an iodine monopoly. (Iodine is a by-product of 
nitrate mining.)
While the junta was appearing more moderate, a challenge 
arose from the leftists outside the government. h group of 
Communist students seized the National University, which was 
still closed awaiting reorganization after the earlier dis­
turbance. The students seized the university press and
24
printed a manifesto demanding the right to participate in the 
new socialist government. Their manifesto also demanded that 
the government give the students suitable headquarters, either 
the Club de la Union or the Municipal Theatre. The outburst 
was important for two reasons. First, the demonstration was 
lead by Elias Lafferte, the head of the Chilean (Moscow) Com­
munist Party. Second, it was the first outbreak of a leftist 
or working-class protest against the "Republic". With the 
demand for participation in the decision-making process, the 
government was faced with a difficult political situation.
It could either co-opt the leftist groups into the government, 
thus opening it to a charge of communism and possible inter­
national intervention, or it could keep the other groups out­
side of the government and thereby limit its already narrow 
potential power base. The junta did nothing for the moment, 
neither stopping the demonstration nor moving against the 
participants. That situation could not be tolerated indefin­
itely. 24
British Charge"* d 'Affaires Thompson, in analyzing the 
confrontation between the Leftists and the government that 
evening, saw two ways the situation could be resolved. First, 
the alliance between the military and the government could 
break over the issue of radicalism. The military would then
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revolt and pave the way for a return of a right-wing military 
dictator, such as Ibanez. Second, the radicals could consoli­
date their position with the military, the Left and the 
people, remain in power and gain influence on the whole con­
tinent. This possiblility held the greater fear for the 
British as it could create repercussions in other countries 
where Britain had interests. To forestall this possibility 
and interject the prospect of intervention into the junta's 
calculations, Thompson suggested that the Parliament and the 
press issue severe warnings against nationalizing foreign 
holdings.
June 11 - Saturday
Saturday was not a banking day so the junta could spend 
its time confronting other problems. Foremost was the recov­
ery of the National University, still in communist hands. 
Grove, as Defense Minister, went on the radio in the early 
morning hours and broadcast a warning to the communists.
While this warning was dutifully reported as a serious stand 
against communism, it sounded more like an inter-left polemic.
Grove's message was clear; the junta would not tolerate 
any attempt by the communists to prevent the government from 
realizing its previously announced socialist goals. "We are
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disposed to continue the program as set forth without taking 
into consideration anybody or anything that may endeavor to 
make us break away."2^ The communists were being presented 
with a choice; either support the government and obtain 
socialism its way, or stay out of its path. Should they 
choose to exercise neither of these options, Grove made quite 
clear his feelings when he said, "We will use a hand of steel 
in putting down Communist actions designed to create a sub­
stitute for the regime as established by the junta."2^
A fact not as prominently reported about that speech was 
that Grove concluded by warning the Right that he would suffer 
no interference from that quarter either. Grove made clear 
his intention to back his words by sending a committee Satur­
day to take control of the University. The communists yielded 
without a struggle and no arrests or harassment of the insur­
gents took place. Despite Grove's strong words, it was becom­
ing apparent that he was willing to accept allegiances from 
other Leftists willing to strive for socialism his way. Not 
all of the junta was inclined to be so liberal or friendly 
with the Left.
A huge demonstration of support was held that Saturday 
with an impressive international cast. Socialist leaders 
from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru came to praise the efforts of
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the junta to achieve socialism. In that connection two more 
new programs were announced. First, a National Socialist 
Economic Council was named, with some workers among its mem­
bers. Its job was to meet daily to advise the Cabinet of 
economic problems and suggest courses of action for their 
consideration. Second, the Department of Labor announced that 
it would begin feeding 250,000 unemployed in nine cities 
twice daily. Both programs were designed to generate worker 
support and restore the junta's reputation as a friend of the 
masses, after refusing the communist students' demands.
Even though banking was not the main topic of the day, it 
remained a problem which simply would not go away. The Finance 
Minister issued a statement confirming the original banking 
decrees. Given the radical atmosphere of the day, he main­
tained they were justified and would be put into effect. He 
also warned foreign banks that if they resisted, the govern­
ment would take appropriate actions. His statement insured 
that banking was to remain a problem during the upcoming 
week.
June 12 - Sunday
Sunday could have been a quiet day for the government. 
After its first full week in existence, Sunday seemed like a
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good time for the1 regime to rest, reflect on the distance 
covered and the course yet to be travelled. But for true 
revolutionaries, the Sabbath is- just another day, and Matte 
and Grove were not in the mood to stop the revolution even 
for a day.
/
That Sunday afternoon, Davila resigned from the junta.
It was probably no accident that he was strongly criticized 
by the leftist paper "Opinion" that day. "Opinion" was a 
leading proponent of the movement to dissolve Gosach. Davila 
was criticized for his moderation toward the foreign inter­
ests. Grove and Matte were still seen as sticking to the 
original radical program and did not come under fire from the 
Left.
It had become more apparent as the week went on that the 
junta and the principal leaders of the coup were not of one 
mind politically. Grove and Matte believed that great sacri­
fices by the capitalistic and foreign interests were necessary
/  ,
to socialize the country. Davila, General Puga and General 
Arturo Merino, now Grove's successor as Commander of the Air 
Force, believed that socialism could be achieved through an 
evolutionary process, within the bounds of normal govern­
mental activities. A clash between the groups was inevitable 
if the regime's course was ever to be clearly defined. So
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The government could only look toward that segment of 
the people who were the weakest in terms of experience, organ­
ization and resources; the workers and the poor. Even here 
the regime's support was neither uniform nor strong. The 
rural work force was under the paternalistic control of the 
landlords, who remained the bastion of the opposition. So 
the government was heavily courting the urban workers, lower 
middle class and the unemployed. These were the traditional 
members of the Left. The radical press was now completely 
unbridled; their papers and posters covered the city, but the 
ever-present discord within the Left kept them from being a 
united political force. The regime had to know that it had a 
very weak base and its continued survival depended on a very 
impressive performance, very quickly.
The government announced a new vehicle for creating sup­
port. This program was designed to extend the government's 
ability to communicate with and influence the masses. A new 
commission was created to bring culture to the masses. Oper­
ating on the premise that a socialist state has a duty to 
advance public culture, the commission was endowed with 
impressive resources. It was to have a state-owned theater, 
radio station, printing plant, art school and movie studio. 
These facilities would allow the commission to disseminate
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educational and entertaining programs to increase the musical, 
literary, artistic and social awareness of the people. Should 
the government strive long enough for the operations to be­
come effective, the commission could also become a powerful
on
tool for creating public opinion and support. u 
June 13 - Monday
Monday was the day to try to regroup the government if it 
was to have any hope of survival. Two significant personnel 
changes were announced. Rolando Merino was promoted from 
Interior Minister to the junta to fill Davila's place. Arturo 
Ruiz Mufei, a Santiago municipal official, was named the new 
Interior Minister. With these moves, Grove and Matte, alone 
among the original conspirators, remained in positions of 
power. Puga remained as the Provisional President, but his 
role was that of a figurehead. Grove and Matte had now filled 
all the powerful positions with radicals of their choosing.
If they wished to make a radical government, the means were 
now at their disposal.
/
Grove commented that day on Davila's resignation. He
/
wished, he said, to put to rest the impression that Davila's 
leaving was the result of another military coup. Speaking 
as the Defense Minister he gave the military view on the event:
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I wish to make a statement denying the rumors, 
which are entirely untrue, about difficulties hav­
ing occurred between members of the armed forces, 
concerning the alleged claims of military groups 
to exercise some control over the actions of the 
junta governing this country. On the contrary, it 
can be declared that the army does not desire to 
become mixed up in public affairs and simply wishes 
to remain united in its efforts to support and pro­
tect the Socialist Republic.
Grove's statement read more like a plea for the army to stay 
in the barracks than a statement of solid military support for 
the revised junta.
The government reorganization had international effects 
since the moves were viewed as steps toward creating a more 
radical government. Washington was very disturbed as they 
had great confidence in Davila, whom the government had known 
from his days there as Ambassador. The United States Ambassa­
dor let his apprehensions be known by protesting the banking 
decrees, state monopolies and any other contemplated moves 
against foreign interests.32 The British were extremely dis­
turbed by the developments and the Chilean question was raised 
in that Monday's debate in Commons. The public warning 
Thompson had requested on Friday was delivered by Mr. Eden, 
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
His Majesty's government has not entered into 
official relations with the present government, but 
his Majesty's Charge' d'Affaires has been instructed 
to inform (them) that his Majesty's government takes
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a most serious view of these confiscatory measures 
and, if they are carried through, will strongly 
support a demand for full compensation for the 
British investors affected.33
With the protests and the warning the spector of international 
intervention arose.
Knowing the international feelings on the previously 
announced banking decrees, the junta issued a change of policy. 
The Finance Minister officially retracted the decree establi­
shing the Banco Del Estado. The Central Bank would return to 
its former operation. He also commented that nothing detri­
mental to any foreign interest would be done soon.
Despite these assurances, the Minister also brought an 
ominous shadow back to light; the question of the disposition 
of Cosach. The Cosach question had been largely ignored while 
the banking problems were in the forefront. Now it appeared 
that Cosach was to be the issue on which Grove wished to make 
his fight. The Minister announced that Cosach would be 
expected to provide drafts for foreign exchange necessary to 
continue operations. Also Cosach would be expected to con­
tinue full production during the period its future was under 
consideration. The Minister did caution the public not to 
expect immediate and violent measures yet as the matter still 
required much study. The fact that the matter was under study
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again served a clear warning to foreign concerns.34 
June 14 - Tuesday
Tuesday the new junta began to mark its course more 
clearly. Senator Aurelio Nunez Morgado was appointed the new 
Superintendent of Nitrate Mines. This was a particularly 
significant appointment as Senator Nunez had just been elected 
to the leadership of the Radical Socialist Party in May. That 
Party was the most significant organization of the Left. His 
appointment was the junta's first move to incorporate other 
leftist groups into the government coalition. Nunez's appoint­
ment to oversee the nitrate industry was particularly suitable 
from the radicals' viewpoint. A civil engineer by training, 
Nunez authored his party's strong stand against Cosach; "The 
'Cosach1 shall be immediately dissolved and those chiefly 
responsible for its formation shall be punished.”3  ^ While 
mounting the challenge for a battle over Cosach, the junta did
nothing in the banking field. Apparently banking was viewed 
/
as Davila's fight which he had lost. The new junta would make 
its stand on nitrates.
The junta announced two additional debt reforms to aid 
the middle and lower classes. The government decreed a 30-day 
moratorium on all debts of retail merchants. Furthermore, they
35
extended the loans of small businessmen through the National 
Savings Banks. These moves would hopefully relieve some of 
the pressures on the small merchants allowing them to hold 
current prices and not contribute to the rising inflation. 
This, in turn, would aid the lower classes.
In another reform aimed at the middle class, the junta
announced a solution to the university problem. Now that both 
the student opponents of the regime and the Communists had 
relinquished control of the buildings, the government felt 
confident enough to discontinue its earlier controls. The 
University was once more made a self-governing body. This 
practice was more in line with the Reforms of C o r d o b a , 36 
which were the standards accepted by most of the educated 
classes. While none of these reforms were especially revolu­
tionary, taken together they began to show a concerted push 
to acquire support from the middle classes.
While the new junta continued on its way, Davila was not
quite prepared to be totally left out of the public spotlight. 
Tuesday he published an open letter to his former colleagues 
and the country. He explained his resignation simply,
The Socialist Revolution is an accomplished
fact.
It is possible that I have made mistakes.
Many times I have gone against the opinions of
most of you . . . but always I have proceeded
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with the deepest revolutionary sincerity and in a 
manner foreign to all classes or groups or inter­
ests or considerations which did not aim at the 
same ideas which made us march together in a brief 
but transcendental step in the life of the country.
My withdrawal is not a subtraction from the 
revolutionary forces, but, on the contrary, an aid.
It leaves my friends free of all personalist sus­
picions, so they can collaborate better to accom­
plish their w o r k . 3 ^
Davila's sentiments were certainly admirable and quite 
reassuring to the junta and the people. It was obvious that 
his resignation was that of a highly principled and public- 
spirited man, not the result of another military coup. But 
while his sentiments were above reproach, both his assurances 
to stay out of the government and his "revolutionary sincer->• 
ity" were suspect. His actions had indicated that his revolu­
tionary activities were confined to overthrowing the govern­
ment, not to attempting a thoroughgoing revolution. The
/
question remained: Would Davila's revolutionary inclinations
drive him to another coup?3®
June 15 - Wednesday
Wednesday was a day when the news of Chile mostly origin­
ated from foreign sources. This was not unusual in light of 
the "Times" (London) report on the following day that a strict 
censorship of the mails and cables leaving the country had
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been imposed on Wednesday. The domestic situation did not 
seem to warrant such actions, but the international scene was 
heating up. It was learned late Tuesday that the British 
government was dispatching the cruiser H.M.S. Durban to Peru. 
The move, according to the Secretary of the Admiralty, was,
". . . i n  order to be ready in case of need for the protec­
tion of British interests in C h i l e . A p p a r e n t l y ,  Mr. Eden's 
remarks to Commons Monday were not just rhetoric.
Also on the international scene Wednesday, the French 
Ambassador protested the measures which affected the French 
interests in Chile. In the United States, the Chilean Ambas­
sador talked to the New York bankers, informing them that the 
Central Bank would operate as before. His conversations were 
to attempt to calm the fears of the international bankers, who 
controlled enormous investments in Chile.
The only real news from within Chile that day was the 
fact that the trolleys stopped running. The railway workers, 
who had become Grove's and Matte's most solid supporters, 
walked off their jobs to attend rallies called in support of 
the new junta. Wednesday had all the appearances of the calm 
before a storm.
The suspicion that a storm was coming was confirmed by 
Ambassador Culberson in a conversation with British envoy
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Thompson, a conversation which Thompson reported to London 
but Culberson left out of his report to Washington:
United States Ambassador told me today (June 
15) that preparations for counter revolutionary 
movement were actively progressing and he antici­
pated important developments in 2 or 3 days or at 
the most within a week. He felt position of Junta 
had greatly weakened. While I have no means of 
confirming the above I agree with His Excellency's 
further remark that much now depends upon the 
morale of N.C.O.'s. who are a more or less perman­
ent body but who have been for months objective of 
communist propaganda. There is much reason to 
suppose their superiors are uneasily conscious 
that they have been made fools of while the con­
scripts are generally of such low mental calibre 
that they will follow any decisive lead.4!
If such preparations were underway and Culberson knew of them
it was reasonable to assume that Davila, who was a personal
friend of Culberson, was involved in the plot. Many elements
were now prepared to back the moderate socialists against the
radicals. A counter-coup lead by Davila would have a good
chance of regaining control of the government.
June 16 - Thursday
A climax of revolutionary action was reached on Thursday. 
The junta got the day off to a good start. They approved a 
plan to have the state represented by six, rather than three, 
members on the board of the revived Central Bank. Further, 
the junta announced it was appointing a commission to study
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the foreign currency confiscation decrees and its report was 
due in a month and a half. During those 45 days, the decrees 
would be held in abeyance. This would give everyone time to 
find some livable solution to the banking problem.
Having put off the threat from the international inter-
}
ests, the junta turned to revolutionizing the country. The 
Health Ministry announced it was studying a new plan to soc­
ialize medicine. The plan called for the government to super­
vise the whole medical field. Free medical care would be 
given to everyone, with the program financed by an annual 
fee paid by each person in proportion to his income. While 
this plan would bring relief to the lower classes, and their 
enthusiastic support, it was sure to bring howls of pain from 
the upper classes and professionals.
The junta was not the only group to be in a revolution­
ary mood that day. The Liga de Accion, a leftist political 
group, published a manifesto demanding the dissolution of all 
religious orders and a total reorganization of the Church in 
Chile. The manifesto called for the nationalization of the 
clergy and restriction of their numbers to one clergyman for 
every 50,000 inhabitants. The League further proposed seizing 
the Church lands and putting them to public use. Lastly, the 
manifesto demanded Chile have a divorce law. While the ideas
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were in the spirit of the day, they were not likely to win 
many converts to the radical causes from among the Conserva­
tives .
While the junta was making revolutionary plans, its
/
former members were engaged m  the same task. Davila and 
Generals Puga and Arturo Merino, three of the five original 
conspirators who had overthrown the government on June 4, 
decided to have another go at it that day. Their revolt be­
gan about seven in the evening. They began by sending a 
group of army officers into the Presidential Palace to arrest 
Colonel Grove. However, Grove Hid in a back room until they 
left and then began making hasty calls for support.
It appeared that this latest coup would not be without a 
clash of arms. An insurgent infantry regiment occupied the 
Ministry of War Building across the street from the President­
ial Palace. Grove's supporters in the Cavalry mounted machine 
guns on top of the Palace. Members of the Aviation School, 
still loyal to Grove, bombed the infantry barracks and dropped 
flares over the city. Some fire was exchanged across the 
Calle Moneda. Both sides spent most of their time broad­
casting pleas for public support over the radio. Civilian 
crowds massed and some Communists responded to Grove's pleas 
for support by attacking two churches near the battle scene,
41
causing the Carabineros to be sent to quell the disturbance.
By 2:00 A.M., it was clear that the bulk of the military 
was supporting the insurgents. Grove's troops went over to 
the other side. General Merino, who had led the insurgent 
troops, entered the Palace and was greeted by General Piuga, 
still a member of the junta. Merino assured him the insur­
gents only wanted Grove and Matte. Merino even offered Puga 
the presidency of the new junta, but Puga declined it. Grove 
and Matte were arrested. The insurgents had triumphed again, 
for the second time in as many weeks.
Even as this new socialist revolution was in progress, 
a change was clearly coming. More than 500 alleged commun­
ists were arrested, including their two most important lead­
ers, Lafferte and Chamundez. The army officers who attacked
 
the Palace in the early attempt to seize Grove explained to 
reporters that they wished the "Maintenance of national 
socialism, divested of Communists, and the expulsion from 
the government of the fanatic and anti-patriotic elements."42 
The Thermidorian Reaction had arrived. This time the "Social­
ist Republic" was going to be much less socialist and little 
more republican.43
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June 17 - Friday
By early Friday it had become clear that a brief era had 
ended. The staffing of the new "Socialist Republic" and the 
statements of its members brought the changes into focus.
General Puga moved from the junta to become Minister of 
Defense, Grove's previous position. Rolando Merino was dis­
missed from the junta and not given any position in the new 
government. The third junta member, Matte, was in jail with 
Grove awaiting transport into exile. Davila became the new 
Provisional President. General Arturo Merino was returned to 
his military command.
Early Friday the new government issued a manifesto explain­
ing its goals and plans:
We wish to call a constitutional assembly, 
which at the earliest possible date will draw up 
a plan for a new political constitution, based on 
the Socialist Organization of the State.
While the assembly fulfills its duties, the 
new junta will uphold all statutes and resolutions 
within the present constitution and existing laws 
of the Republic unless they openly clash with the 
progressive spirit which now inspires the new 
regime.
The junta will give due respect to the inde­
pendence of the courts of justice and commits it­
self to recognize and respect international obli­
gations .44
This manifesto was a statement of moderation in comparison 
with the June 5 document. The radical projects demanded
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earlier were either absent or explicitly denied in the new
45program. ^
General Merino explained the army's role in the new 
regime, while criticizing Grove and Matte for allowing the 
army to become involved in politics:
It (the army) rose because it could not remain 
unmoved in the face of unruly actions by bold citi­
zens who, forgetting patriotism, were exploiting 
communist ideas that were an insult to the national 
flag, despising the rights of other citizens of Chile.
We must start a period of social peace and wel­
fare today, while the army units return to their 
garrisons, delivering into the hands of civilian 
patriots the pursuit and practical applications of 
sound Socialist i d e a l s . 46
With General Merino emerging as the military strongman behind 
the new junta, his statement accented two trends of the new 
regime. First was his reaction against the radicalism of the 
previous regime which he characterized as "unpatriotic" and 
its actions "communist". Second, he downgraded class anta­
gonism, which is the heart of all leftist ideologies. The 
"sound socialist ideals", if they conformed to Merino's 
speech, were likely to be very mild.
Grove's anti-foreign capitalist stance was also altered 
immediately by the regime. The new Finance Minister, Senator 
Zanarta, spoke about the new regime's approaches to the 
Cosach question. He did not believe Cosach would be so great
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a problem under the new regime as it had been for Grove. He 
remarked that while the Cosach agreement could be altered, it 
could not be violated. Through a suitable alteration, he be­
lieved Chile could have her natural mineral rights protected, 
but without having to assume control over the mines or plants. 
His attitude made the possibility of nationalization and ex­
propriation of the industry most unlikely. He was able to say 
that day, "I firmly believe that the settlement we will make 
will be equitable and acceptable to all parties concerned, 
while it will maintain unimpaired the sources of national 
wealth".47 With such an attitude, international conciliation 
was likely and any changes to Cosach would be minor.
On its first day the new "Socialist Republic" repudiated 
the main points of its predecessor: class struggle to create
a new society, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and radical 
change to reshape the state and its functions. Davila's new 
government proclaimed its belief in socialism throughout its 
three-month life, but, from the first morning onward, it was 
evident that this time it was state socialism, not the 
"socialist revolution". The new junta was another reformist 
regime, but the revolution was over. The legend of the real 
"twelve day Socialist Republic" was born before the institu­
tion bearing its name even died.
Interpretations
and
Viewpoints
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The Socialist Legend
The Socialists found themselves in a strange position, 
following the June 16 counter-revolution. A "Socialist 
Revolution" had overthrown the government and attempted a 
radical transformation of the country. All this before the 
Socialist Party was even formed. When the Party was esta­
blished in 1933, it inherited the legacy of that revolution 
and a "Republic" which had failed in almost every important 
venture it had attempted. Despite its failure, the heritage 
of the "Republic" was a valuable asset as a rallying point 
for socialist organization. The "Republic's" programs had 
pointed the direction for the ensuing socialist policy, in 
the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist fields, to follow.
The noted interpreter of social revolutions, Regis 
Debray, has presented the current evolution Grove legend in 
his Conversations w ith Allende. Debray is one of the most 
influential radical philosophers on Latin America today. He 
first gained recognition for his wor'ks on the Cuban Revolu­
tion and the new revolutionary strategy. By the time of his 
capture in Bolivia, while fighting with Che Guevara, he had 
attained the acme of the writer-revolutionary. As a friend 
of President Allende, his interpretation of Chilean revolu­
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tionary history has considerable force and impressive credi­
bility. His version of the "Socialist Republic" is considered 
history in many quarters.
The capitulation to imperialism and the politi­
cal repression of the Ibanez dictatorship (1931) fol­
lowed by the class rule of Montero (1932), had left 
behind a wave of social discontent expressed in 
strikes and other political actions by embryonic 
workers' organizations and left-wing political parties.
Tenacious political work by a number of social­
ist groups, combined with the discontent of the masses 
and the injustices committed by those in power, 
brought victory to a revolutionary movement led by 
Colonel Marmaduke Grove (military leader) and Eugenio 
Matte (civilian leader). On 4 June 1932 President 
Montero was ousted and a socialist government was 
established.
With a 150 point programme and under the slogan 
"Bread, a Roof and Shelter" the new government embarked 
on a series of concrete measures in favor of the dis­
possessed. Viewed today these measures appear extra­
ordinarily ingenuous and naive - suspension of evic­
tions of tenants, the return of objects pledged to 
the Popular Credit Bank, the granting of popular 
credits to small traders, etc. - but they undoubtedly 
provoked the immediate anger of the reactionary right. 
Moreover, the new government was clearly anti-imper­
ialist: its economic programme stated that ...'all 
heavy industry extracting primary products and a 
large part of the public services are in the hands of 
foreign enterprises. Our privileged classes have 
lived in the lap of luxury and comfort provided by 
foreign capitalism, in exchange for our natural wealth 
and the misery of the people'.
The programme of the revolutionaries did not 
attempt either the socialization of the means of pro­
duction or the confiscation of great fortunes. More­
over, the government did not rely decisively on the 
masses to carry through its programme. It was there­
fore overthrown after twelve days by a coup d'etat 
supported by the national bourgeoisie and imperialism.
But there is no doubt that, despite its short duration,
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the Revolutionary Junta was an inspiration for the 
working class; and it united behind it five small 
socialist movements which fused the following year 
to found the Socialist Party.^
No one has remained more closely identified with the 
Grove legend than the present President of Chile, Salvador 
Allende. Allende's long association with the Socialists and 
widespread campaigning on that legacy have done much to popu­
larize Grove's reputation.
President Allende discussed the “Socialist Republic" 
with Debray and commented on that portion of the legacy which 
is viewed as most significant by contemporary leftists; the 
emergence of mass political consciousness and the development 
of the Socialist Party. "The Socialist Party has a tradition 
of anti-imperialism which is bound up in history with the 
process known in this country as the 'Socialist Revolution' 
which began 4 June 1932. Although it was only of short dura­
tion, this process had a profound influence on vanguard 
t h o u g h t . Allende was one of those whose thoughts were 
influenced by the "Republic".
In April, 1933, following the fall of Grove's government, 
the Socialist Party was founded. The legacy of the "Republic" 
and its former members were the dominant influences. Allende 
can well make his claims as to the origin of the Socialist
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Party for, as he said to Debray, "I didn't join the Social­
ist Party, Regis - I am a founder, one of the founders of 
the Socialist Party". Another of those founders was 
Marmaduke Grove.^ As a Socialist participant in the Popular 
Front government under Cerda and as the leader who eventually 
brought the Socialist Party to power in 1970, Allende's view 
of the evolution of the party and its ideological origins is 
often considered the most knowledgable and correct.
Allende's connections with Grove and the "Republic" were 
hardly ephemeral or coincidental. He was active enough as a 
student to be arrested five times following Grove's fall.
His relationship to that government was personal as well as 
political. "Other members of my family were also put into 
prison [following the "Republic's" fall] including my brother- 
in-law, Marmaduke Grove's brother . . . As you can see, we
had close ties with Grove. Allende continued hds political 
association with Grove, though often critical of his tactics, 
throughout the next decade until finally ousting Grove from 
the Party leadership in 1943.6 Grove's influence on Allende 
appears undeniable. Allende's interpretation of the 
"Republic's" role in Chilean history remains unchallenged, 
knowledgable and political.
Richard Feinberg's observations, The Triumph of Allende,
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on the 1970 presidential election, presented the popular view 
of the Grove government. "Unfortunately for the well- 
intentioned (jj'rove, he was deposed after twelve glorious days 
(11 should have armed the people1, he said later). . . .
Out of the ashes of 'Manna's' efforts was created, in the 
following year, the Socialist Party of Chile, of which 
Salvador Allende was the f o u n d e r . F e i n b e r g  can be excused 
for relating this view as history. He was a Peace Corps 
agronomist working in Chile during the election. It is 
testimony to the strength of the legend, even among the 
agrarian sector, that this is the version he was told.
The essence of the Socialist interpretation of the 
"Socialist Republic" rests on four points. First: Grove led 
a socialist revolution rising out of the discontent of the 
oppressed masses. Second: The "Republic" was essentially 
anti-imperialist and pro-working class in orientation. Third: 
The causes of the "Republic's" fall were due to its program 
not being radical enough and not allowing sufficient mass 
participation to withstand the reaction of the bourgeoisie 
and foreign capitalists. Fourth: The "Republic1 provided the 
ideological and organizational groundwork for its program's 
eventual triumph under Allende.
The legacy of the "Republic" was a mixed blessing for
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the Socialists. Without the heritage, the Socialist leaders 
would not have had the moral authority among the leftists 
which was necessary to forge the many splinter groups into a 
coherent party. On the other hand, a careful study of the 
"Republic" would show a rather hollow inheritance. While its 
proclamations had sounded good, its actions had inevitably 
failed to match its decrees, and had often directly contra­
dicted its espoused intentions. As a legend the "Republic" 
was a revered rallying point for the new Socialist Party. As 
history, it could become an albatross of failures around their 
necks, having to be explained away to other leftists.
The Communist Interpretation
If any doubt existed in the minds of the Left that the 
"Socialist Republic" was dead by mid-June, the next issue of 
the "Communist International" should have laid it to rest.
In the summary article, "June Events in Chile", the "Inter­
national” presented a detailed analysis of past history. Per­
haps more than any other, this article, and the official view 
it represented, colored the ensuing reputation of the Grove 
government. Just as Marx had published his Civil War In 
France giving the official view a mere two days after the 
fall of the Commune, once again the Communists rushed to the
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presses, published first and claimed the official interpreta­
tion for their own.
The Communist analysis was thorough and detailed, if 
strewn with inaccuracies. Their analysis began from the 
premise that a revolutionary mass had been waiting for the 
opportunity to make the inevitable revolution. In the Commun­
ist view, it could not have been a military coup, a revolu­
tion from the top. The revolution had to spring from the 
wells of proletarian discontent. "The fundamental and most 
important feature of the latest events (June 1932) is the 
deep revolutionary mass movement, particularly of the workers 
and urban petty bourgeoisie, which did not, however, have a 
revolutionary leadership and was therefore utilized by the 
opposing cliques of the ruling c l a s s e s . T h e  leaders were 
not the makers of the revolution but were, instead, the inept 
manipulators of its defeat. Davila was seen as representing 
the bourgeoisie and the landed oligarchy. Grove was seen in 
a better light as being the leader of the petty bourgeois 
elements. The differences in the classes of the leaders
caused the "Republic" to have two distinct phases.
/
The Davila-Grove phase was seen as all thunder and little 
lightning. Worse yet, with what little lightning there was, 
its bolts were often aimed toward the revolution's friends
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and not the enemies so thunderously enumerated.
Seeking to utilize the support of the masses . . . 
the Davila-Grove government . . . engaged in extensive
anti-imperialist and even anti-capitalist social 
demagogy, and proclaimed the establishment of a 
"Socialist Republic of Chile". This demagogy alarmed 
even a large section of the imperialist press at 
first . . .  A few days later it had become sufficient­
ly clear that Davila had no intention of going beyond 
vague promises and demagogic attacks against imperial­
ism. The government of the "Socialist Republic of 
Chile" not only repudiated all charges of "bolshevism", 
"communism" and its intention to repeat the "Russian 
experience", but announced its intention to mercilessly 
suppress the Communist Party of Chile. The imperialist 
press regained its peace of mind - the introduction of 
socialism was in safe hands.^
Under Davila, the "International" believed the "Republic"
bordered on outright treason to the cause it espoused.
If that indictment was not enough, the Communists listed
the individual failures of the period. The failure to dissolve
Cosach was probably the most grievous sin. That could have
been a strong blow against international imperialism. The old
communist charge hurled against the Communards arose again. A
revolution must nationalize the banks, not in decrees as
/  . . .
Davila did, but m  practice. To strike at the banks is an
essential double-edged revolutionary blow; it gives the
revolution funds to carry on and, it hits at the very heart of
the capitalist power, destroying its ability to continue.
Other failures, not seizing foreign currency, not sufficiently
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aiding the unemployed or disbanding religious orders, were 
also criticized in turn. But these were small errors, not 
tactical blunders as the banks and Cosach were. No true 
revolutionary would have allowed such imperialist institutions 
to elude his grasp. u
The Grove-Matte period fared somewhat better under the 
Communist review: These leaders won qualified praise for
their decision to. confiscate foreign currency,, for appointing 
Nunez as Superintendent of Nitrate Mines with orders to dis­
mantle Cosach, as well as for seizing excess gold from private 
sources. The moves to control food prices and feed the un­
employed were seen as particularly laudable.
But Grove and Matte did not rate a clean slate from the 
''International" critics either. Certainly they were still in 
part responsible for the failures of the first phase, although 
their performance improved after getting more leeway by dump­
ing Davila. Both their greatest failure and greatest signifi­
cance came in the field of political theory. Their failure 
was their inability to establish any clear political program 
or delineate a course of action. This incapacitated their 
efforts to form any mass organization which could have sup­
ported the regime and carried through its programs.
The Communists viewed the significance of the Grove-Matte
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the Party, or notice that the Party had been upstaged by a 
genuinely revolutionary group. As a legend, the "Republic1' 
was obscure and harmless to the Communists; as history it 
could come back to haunt the Party in its Latin American 
ventures.
To both of the major groups of the Left, Communists and 
Socialists, the "Republic" was best preserved as legend, not 
as written history. For their own sectarian interests, they 
chose to preserve and use the legend. The best explanation 
might have been to view the "Republic" as a military coup with 
socialist policies, but this would never fit either of their 
needs. Perhaps that is what Norton saw, when viewing the 
week-old "Republic", he wrote, "A socialism which rides into 
power on a military dictatorship will be neither dangerous 
to its opponents nor effective to its friends
A Foreign Perspective
The British Embassy saw the "revolution" in an entirely 
different light than the Left did. In a confidential letter 
to the Cabinet, Charge/d 'Affaires Thompson analyzed the 
"revolution's" causes and course. His point of departure was 
radically different from the Left's premise. The British saw 
the uprising as a personalistic revolt by Grove against being
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relieved of his command by a weak President Montero. Thompson 
said the coup, " . . .  needn't have been. One well-led and 
well-disciplined machine-gun company of a British line regi­
ment could have put an end to the entire movement".-1'4 Having 
succeeded in cowing the weak President into allowing him to 
assume power, Grove then set up a military d i c t a t o r s h i p . ^
While a military dictatorship, in and of itself, did not 
particularly bother the British, this regime greatly upset them 
as they believed it to be primarily incompetent, and secondari­
ly, favoring radicalism. Thompson reported that responsible 
opinion in Chile " . . .  believed that it would scarcely have 
been possible to collect together a more irresponsible collec­
tion of men . . ."16 than Grove's cabinet. While Thompson
had no faith in the ability of the regime to effect its pro­
gram, he felt extremely uneasy about the prospects of what 
these irresponsible radicals might attempt.1^
With the exit of Davila and Arturo Merino from the govern­
ment things took a decided turn for the worse. In reporting 
these personnel changes, Thompson commented, 1 In other words 
we are dealing with a virtual dictator (Grove) who has violent 
views and whom I firmly believe is not quite responsible for 
his actions".18 At this point, began a very definite and 
somewhat uncontrolled movement toward communism. Fanned on
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by the radical propaganda and atmosphere, the country rapidly 
drfited to the point of either becoming communist or having 
another military revolt to restore the government to firm and 
competent h a n d s . T h e  counter-coup came and the " . . .  re­
sult of the counter-revolution is welcomed by all responsible 
opinion here as having saved us from a communistic regime (in 
retrospect it seems clear the situation on June 15 and 16 was 
about as bad as it could be)."20
Thompson believed that the counter-coup was partially the 
result of the sound British policy. The pressures caused by 
the warnings from Parliament and the press and the dispatch­
ing of a warship formed part of the causes which moved the 
military to revolt.
I have heard from several sources that the move­
ments of H.M.S. Durban formed the subject of discus­
sion at various meetings of military officers which 
preceeded the counter-revolution of the 16th June, 
and also that they caused no small stir in naval 
circles. The news appears to have come as a severe 
blow to the pride of the armed forces and may well 
have proved one of the factors which determined them 
to act against Grove.21
Despite this reprieve from communism, Thompson still felt the
future was rather bleak as the passions of the masses, loosed
by Grove and Matte, would prove difficult to control and
their radicalism, once awakened, might reappear in the future.22
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A Historical Analysis
To render an accurate evaluation of the legend of the 
"Socialist Republic" one must inspect each of its four main 
contentions. First, that Grove led a socialist revolution 
arising out of the discontent of the oppressed masses. The 
analysis of both the Socialist and Communist Parties support 
this contention. No other assertion of the legend rests on 
so little evidence. It is true that the masses, and the 
country as a whole, were dissatisfied with the state of af­
fairs in Chile during the early 1930's. President Ibanez had 
been forced into resigning in 1931 by popular strikes, parti­
cularly among the professions. The people were not particu­
larly pleased with his successor's, President Montero's, 
attempts to alleviate the effects of the world depression on 
Chile either. However, the people were not prepared to, and 
did not, revolt. The "Socialist Revolution" was a military 
coup. Of its five main leaders, only Matte had any real and 
tangible connections with the masses. At no time during the 
day-long revolt of June 4 did the people come out and aid in 
the overthrow of the government. Their only revolutionary 
activity in aid of the coup was withholding support from 
either side. The "Socialist Revolution" was a revolution
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from the top, made by a group of well-intentioned men, joined 
together by the common desire to attempt to relieve Chile's 
problems by socialist methods.
Second, the legend contends that the "Republic" was es­
sentially anti-imperialistic and pro-working class in orient­
ation. There is little doubt that the "Republic" favored the 
lower classes. From its initial manifesto until its fall, 
most of its decrees were for reforms in their favor. These 
reforms were the essence of its claim to being socialist. The 
anti-imperialist claim is harder to accept. While the mani­
festo and many decrees did attack foreign capitalists, the 
government took no action on this front. Each program 
announced in that direction was rescinded almost immediately. 
The only real threat to the capitalists came in the second 
week when Grove appointed Nunez to resolve the nitrate prob­
lem. Perhaps with more time the anti-imperialist intentions 
could have become reality. While the "Republic" did aid the 
workers, it never effectively challenged the imperialists.
Third, the legend alleges that the causes of the "Repub­
lic's" downfall were due to its program not being radical 
enough and not allowing sufficient mass participation to 
withstand the reaction of the bourgeoisie and foreign capi­
talists. While this explains the "Republic's" demise in
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proper revolutionary fashion, it hardly does justice to the 
known facts. The main cause of Grove's fall was that he had 
become the leader of a military coup which no longer had the 
support of the military. After purging Davila and Arturo 
Merino, and stripping Puga of any real power, Grove had alien­
ated his main pillars of support. Coupled with the military's 
fear of communism and foreign intervention, his position be­
came untenable.
The upper classes never really made any serious attempt 
to crush the "Republic". Neither did the threat from abroad 
smash the revolution. The United States and Britian were 
clearly worried about their investments. They could be ex­
pected to make serious demands or even impose sanctions on 
Chile if their holdings were nationalized. However, the one 
lone warship sent by Britian toward Chile was neither a strong 
enough nor real enough threat to topple the government.
If anything, the "Republic1 was too radical too quickly. 
The military saw the radicalism as moving toward communism. 
They joined behind the moderate socialist faction led by 
Davila before the Grove faction had time to build any real 
mass base of support. There were some indications that the 
masses had begun to move toward Grove's positions. The Com­
munists replying to his pleas for support during the June 16
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coup and the railway workers striking to protest his ouster, 
pointed out that with more time he might have built an altern­
ate power base to replace the military. Grove's mistake was
/
not in purging Davila and the power he represented, but in 
doing it too soon and leaving himself nowhere to turn for 
support.
To have armed the workers, as they demanded, for a 
Commune-style defense would have been suicidal. There was no 
reason to believe the workers would have defended the govern­
ment, regardless of how radical it was. Had the workers 
attempted to do so, they surely would have been crushed by 
the military. For the "Republic" to have been more radical, 
without a revolutionary mass to sustain it, would only have 
shortened its existence even further.
Finally, the legend contends that the "Republic" pro­
vided the ideological and organizational groundwork for its 
program's eventual triumph. Herein lies the legend's 
strength. The "Republic" provided the Socialists with three 
important guides. First, the Socialists renounced any inten­
tion of attempting the revolution by coup again. Rather they 
would build an electoral coalition to seize power within the 
system. Given Chile's legalistic political tradition this 
was the wisest method of obtaining and maintaining power.
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Second, the "Republic's" fall pointed out the need for con­
solidation and organization of the Left. Within a year this 
was accomplished, with the founding of a coalition Socialist 
Party of Chile. This new party provided the Socialists and 
the whole Left with a base of support upon which to work. 
Lastly, the "Republic" provided a rallying point to attract 
converts. It stood as a real and visible example of an 
alternate direction in which the country could move. By its 
presence in the political heritage, the legend of the "Social­
ist Republic" provided the motivation to make itself a real­
ity.
Appendixes
Appendix A
DECLARATION OP THE REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA 
TO THE COUNTRY MADE AT 2.20 A.M., June 
5>th, 1932.
Those elements of the people who hold advanced political 
and economic doctrines can be certain that their basic 
aspirations will be fully satisfied by the Socialist 
Government of Chile, whose sole desire is to bring to the 
unprotected classes the health and well being to which they 
have a legitimate right as the producers of the whole wealth 
of the country.
The workers* organizations, whatever political theories 
they may hold, have an exceptional opportunity for display­
ing their loyal co-operation with the work commenced by those 
whose chief aim is the practical well being of the productive 
forces of the country.
The different Governments which have succeeded one an­
other In the past years have completely failed. The liberal 
doctrines and the specious adherence to legalistic forms 
which inspired their administrative and political conduct, 
cut them off entirely from their times and from reality. 
Further they all lacked sufficient strength with which to 
combat the aggressive influence of foreign imperialism.
The proletariat, the productive classes and the whole 
nation have borne the effects of a social and economic
regime which permits the exploitation of labour, unbridled 
speculation and the sway of galling privileges. The growing 
disorganization of our national economy, the domination, be­
coming daily more absolute, of foreign interests, created and 
operated by plutocracy and oligarcy, the heedlessness and in­
efficiency of the former Governments have continued to ac­
centuate in a tragic degree the misery of the people and the 
approaching death of our national independence.
Yesterday, the heart felt desire for self-preservation, 
which was growing in the public conscience, found the means 
of becoming a reality through the assistance of the armed 
forces. The necessity of placing the organization of the 
nation’s economy upon foundations of justice and of giving 
to the State a functional structure suited to the present com­
plexity of its nature could now no longer be postponed. For 
this end, therefore, a radical change of regime was required.
The new Government will apply itself energetically to the 
solution of the social, political and economic problems of 
Chile. Its action will not be checked by petty personal and 
party considerations and it will keep aloof from any in­
fluence which can weaken its moral force. Its sole aim will 
be the realization of its fundamental plans:- the scientific 
organization of the productive forces under the control of 
the State, the establishment of social justice, and the as­
surance to every Chilean of the right to live and to work.
We are attempting to lay the foundations of a society 
better than the present one within the natural limits imposed
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by the resources of the country and its historical features. 
To attain this end, we believe that the action of the Gov­
ernment must be inspired by socialist principles which re­
flect the various needs and desires of the present time.
It is no longer possible to shut oneself up in the ivory 
tower of the anachronistic theory of liberal individualism 
and of the superstitious respect for laws which result solely 
in the paralization of society and to use these fetiches as 
a pretext for inaction.
The historical justification of any government rests upon 
the action it takes in the interest of the masses. We have 
come to power with the object of carrying out a program of 
spiritual and material renovation. We wish to imbue every 
national activity with a rhythm of energy, youth, efficiency 
and discipline. We will convert into facts not only our im­
mediate aims, which we are publishing to-day, but also our 
general plans for the socialization of the State, trusting, 
as we do, in their beneficent results and possessing the 
assurance that, in the opinion of the country, they will find 
sufficient moral support to prevent any reactionary force 
from harming or destroying them.
We do not believe that the spiritual reserves of Chile 
are exhausted. Everywhere there are brave men prepared for 
constructive action. If until yesterday these men found no
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public scope for their ideals, the time has now come when 
they can take the initiative. We address ourselves to them 
confident that they will be able to co-operate effectively 
in the realization of the ideal which we of the present Gov­
ernment keep before u s .
Credit must be controlled by the State for the benefit of 
the masses in order to avoid the exploitation of the worker 
by the capitalist .
The Government will not permit the paralization of pro­
ductive activities and therefore no concern, whether Chilean 
or foreign, will be allowed to withdraw, on the pretext of 
protecting the interest or profits of its capital, from the 
fulfilment of the duty it possesses to contribute, by its 
production, to the solution of the economic problems of th6 
country.
The Government recognizes its obligation to control In­
ternal and external commerce, taking solely into considera­
tion the interests of society.
Consequently, In its dealings with foreign markets, it 
will aim at freeing the administration of the country from 
the yoke of international and national capitalism.
If it is found necessary, the Government will immediately 
import on its own account, sugar, petroleum, petrol, and 
other essential articles.
In order that It may at once take control of internal com­
merce, the Government will demand from all national and 
foreign concerns a declaration of their stocks of essential 
articles, so that it may be in a position to guarantee to 
the people their normal living requirements.
The Government recognizes as one of its fundamental duties 
the assurance of the necessities of life to every individual 
of society and for this end it will employ every means at 
the disposal of the country.
The Government intends to make work obligatory, so that 
every man may possess the means wherewith to acquire hia 
needs.
During the interval in which the economy of the country 
is being so re-organized that the Government may be able to 
carry out its obligation of providing work for all, the nec­
essary steps will be taken to give food, clothes and lodging 
to the people.
Under the control of the workers' organizations, the dis­
tribution of food will now be efficiently carried out and 
assistance will be rendered by the personnel, transport and 
equipment which the Army has at its disposal.
Until such time as the Government can fulfil its promise 
to give a home to every individual, it will guarantee a 
shelter to those who to-day do not possess the means to pay 
for one.
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The State recognizes that property has a social reason 
for existence and that it must therefore be used in the in­
terests of the people as a whole.
In order to avoid the injustice created by the unequal 
distribution of wealth, the system of taxation will be modi­
fied and large incomes will be heavily taxed.
While this modification is being carried out, a progres­
sively Increasing capital levy will be imposed on all for­
tunes of more than one million pesos.
An economic executive committee will take control of the 
processes of production and distribution In order to adjust 
them to the needs of the masses.
The committee will supervise the productive enterprises 
of the State which will be formed with the object of restor­
ing our capacity of payment for imported articles by creat­
ing new markets for our exports.
Public education will be re-organized upon a basis of 
functional, technical and administrative independence.
Appendix B
THIRTY POINTS OF THE JUNTA'S IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME.
1. Assumption of the whole of the Public Authority by the 
Executive Council and its Ministry.
2. Dissolution of the National Congress.
3. Organisation of the control of food stuffs, with requis­
ition (requisamiento ) and other measures of the kind that 
may be required to assure "el abaratam iento de la poblacion" 
- (presumably means reduction of cost of living).
4. Heavy tax on all big fortunes, without exception, to ob­
tain a sum not less than $500,000,000 pesos. (Rate of ex­
change not stated).
5. Increase of complementary tax on incomes over $36 ,000 
per annum, and an additional tax on Chileans resident 
abroad.
6 . Expropriation of deposits in foreign money and gold, 
paying for them in currency at 6d to the peso.
7. Immediate use of the fiscal farms, of those in debt to 
credit institutions and of those that are unproductive for 
lack of exploitation, for colonisation with unemployed, im­
planted with technical assistance of the State. Army trans­
port to be used in the installation of the colonists.
8 . Expropriation of the land taken over by the State at a 
just valuation and up to the amount of the respective
mortgage obligation.
9. Suspension of the eviction of small renters who have 
fallen behind in their payments and immediate occupation of 
empty houses. The Army will assist in the work.
10. Amnesty for the seamen condemned for the Incidents of 
Coquimbo and Talcahuano and of others under trial or sen­
tenced for political offences, the law relating to the In­
terior security of the State being derogated.
11. Immediate reopening of the nitrate oficinas using the 
Shanks process and other auxiliaries tending to low cost of 
production.
12. Liquidation or immediate reorganisation of the Cosach.
13. State monopoly of gold and exploitation to produce 30 
kilos a day.
1 4 . Monopoly of Iodine, then of petroleum, matches, tobacco, 
alcohol and sugar.
15. Organisation of production till dumping of nitrate and 
iodine is practicable.
16 . State monopoly of foreign trade.
17. Progressive and continuous socialisation of credit.
18. Organisation of a State "Casa de Comercio” annexed to 
the railways for the purchase and sale of articles of prime 
necessity (frutos del pais).
19. Reorganisation of the diplomatic and consular service to 
adapt it to the requirements of foreign trade.
20. Celebration of "Indo-American" treaties.
21. Revision of salaries, pensions and retiring allowances 
reorganising the staff of the public and municipal employees, 
suppressing useless departments and posts. $36,000 pesos 
per annum to be the maximum salary for fiscal, semi-fiscal 
and municipal services.
22. Reorganisation, selection and reduction of the armed 
forces.
23. Improvement and extension of primary education.
21).. Recognition of the Soviet government and revision of the
contracts of foreign companies that amount to monopolies.
2^. Prohibition to import sumptuary articles, silks, cars, 
perfumes, and whatever may be replaced by national industry.
26. Suppression of tax on Argentine cattle, wheat and raw 
materials for national industries elaborating food stuffs.
27. Study of the organisation of a constituent assembly on a 
functional basis to dictate the new Fundamental Constitution 
of the State.
28. Creation of a Ministry of National Health, establishing 
unity of action in the sanitary services of the country.
29. Reorganisation of the Administration of Justice.
30. Tribunal de Sancion Nacional. (The creation of a Court 
for the punishment of offenders against the State.)
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